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Rules, Collective Needs, and Individual Action

A Case Study in a Townhouse Cooperative

Northern Illinois University

An observational and survey study is undertaken to observe how members of a townhouse cooperative seek to reduce collective choice dilemmas. So long as individuals perceive that it is costless to take from the collectivity while someone else is contributing, such dilemmas will arise. At the cooperative we find that a sense of ownership, an understanding of a governmental subsidy, and a willingness to accept rules affect the resolution of such dilemmas. Our findings are used tp show the relevance of both social-psychological theories of fate control and equity theories toward understanding problems of collective choice.

Environment and Behavior, Vol. 13, No. 2, 165-188 (1981)
DOI: 10.1177/0013916581132003


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